

Beam-based RF Station Fault Identification at LCLS

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Outline

1. **Overview:** Anomalies at LCLS
2. **Deep Dive:** RF Station Fault Identification
3. **Extension Work:** CovAD

Anomalies at LCLS

LCLS

- Linac Coherent Light Source (LCLS) is a hard X-ray FEL
- Aim is to deliver an X-ray laser to users around the clock
- User experiments demand stability
- Produces over 200,000 data streams



Anomalies at LCLS

Anomalies vary in degree of impact

1. **Downtime** (beam goes offline)

- ~3% of availability lost to unplanned downtime caused by faults
- >180 hours
- 3+ full user experiments equivalent

2. **FEL performance degradation**

- Unstable beam causes problems for users
- LCLS anomalies → noise/anomalies in user data



To guard against anomalies, operators


- Effectively limit the operational range of accelerator
- Hold certain components (e.g., spare RF stations) in reserve

There are lots of LCLS failure modes!

***Deep Dive:* RF Station
Fault Identification**

RF Station Faults

- Accelerator is powered by RF stations
 - 82 stations
 - Split across 4 regions (L0-L3)



- RF station anomalies are a known, high-priority failure mode
- **Research goals:**
 1. Identify anomalies due to RF stations
 2. Identify the origin of the fault (e.g., which RF station failed and when)

RF Station Diagnostics

- Several diagnostics per RF station already exist
- Shortcomings:
 1. Limited bandwidth
 2. Diagnostics are often incorrect
- Diagnostics → fault attribution




Beam Data

- Beam position and charge measurements
- Shortcomings:
 1. No direct attribution info
 2. Sensitive to other failure modes
- Beam data → fault verification



Need both signals to corroborate the anomaly


Example



* RF Station health is not synchronous.

** Gray region is maximum timing error.

Beam-based RF Station Fault Identification



- Fully automated method
- 1. Candidate identification**
 - Uses diagnostic data
 - Finds candidate anomalies
 - Custom built rules for each diagnostic
 - 2. Candidate confirmation**
 - Uses beam data from dispersive regions (i.e., sensitive to energy changes)
 - Unsupervised time-series method
 - Based on robust z-scores
 - Aggregates scores across BPMs to boost signal-to-noise ratio

Results

- Study period: ~2 months in Winter 2020-2021
- Evaluation: Hand-labeled every anomaly candidate

Variant	Precision	Anomalies Found
Only AMM ¹ diagnostic	0.31	385
AMM ¹ + Beam data	0.91	368
AMPL ² + Beam data	0.88	504

- Takeaways
 - Reduce false positive rate by 20x by checking AMM with beam data
 - Only reduce AMM-based anomalies found by 4% with beam data
 - Switch to AMPL diagnostic increases anomalies found by 44%


¹ AMM: Amplitude mean out of tolerance (binary-valued) ² AMPL: Amplitude (real-valued)

RF Station Attribution

- Study period: Nov. 2020 to Feb. 2022 ¹

Variant	Anomalies Found
AMM + Beam data	1666
AMPL + Beam data	3968

- Equivalent to 2-5 RF station anomalies per day
- Top-5 RF stations account for ~36% of identified anomalies




¹ Only contains 80 days worth of runtime due to various filtering criteria

Extension Work:
CovAD


CovAD: Covariance Learning for Unsupervised AD

- Our RF station method was fundamentally solving a labeling problem
 - Human labels don't widely exist and are time-consuming
 - Raw diagnostics alone led to, at best, noisy labels
 - Beam measurements were used to corroborate the bad labels
 - Needed a lot of LCLS knowledge and custom anomaly methods
- We can rephrase our problem in a more general framework



CovAD

- Assume we have candidate algorithms $A(\theta_s)$ and $A(\theta_q)$ to identify anomalies in each stream
- Only joint events are deemed anomalies
- Better coincidence rate \rightarrow higher precision
- More coincidences \rightarrow higher recall
- **Does NOT require labels!**



CovAD

- Suppose null hypothesis that s and q are independent and anomalies are rare
- We can then define an *unsupervised* analogue to recall
 - $J(\theta_s, \theta_q)$: number of joint events
 - $N(\theta_s, \theta_q)$: number of joint events under a null hypothesis
 - $R(\theta_s, \theta_q)$: estimate of true number of anomalies detected (analogous to recall)
- Which gives



$$R(\theta_s, \theta_q) = \text{cov}(A_{\theta_s}, A_{\theta_q}) = \sum_i A_{\theta_s}(s_i) A_{\theta_q}(q_i) - \left(\frac{1}{n} \sum_i A_{\theta}(s_i) \right) \left(\sum_i A_{\theta_q}(q_i) \right)$$

CovAD

- **Method:** Maximize the covariance $cov(A_{\theta_s}, A_{\theta_q})$
- Upon convergence, both algorithms $A(\theta_s)$ and $A(\theta_q)$ identify features that predict anomalies
 - This is *despite* being fed different inputs
- Equivalent to a clustering method that uses covariance to identify clusters

CovAD: Running on RF Station Faults

- We ran CovAD over the raw RF diagnostics and beam data
- Used two neural networks as the scoring algorithms
- Result: CovAD only labels coincident events as truly anomalous



Thank you!

*RF STATION FAULT
IDENTIFICATION:*

[HTTPS://ARXIV.ORG/ABS/2206.04626](https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.04626)

Appendix


Limiting to “good” beam conditions

- We limit our method to time periods when machine is running at “good” conditions
 1. Beam stopper is inactive (STPR:BSYH:2:STD2_IN_A == 0)
 2. Beam rate is 120Hz (IOC:BSY0:MP01:PC_RATE == 8)
 3. Beam split is 120 Hz HXR/0 Hz SXR
(IOC:IN20:EV01:RG02_ACTRATE == 10)
 4. Beam is actively logged (BPMS:IN20:221:TMITCUH1H logged at 1Hz)
 5. Beam has “good” charge (BPMS:IN20:221:TMITCUH1H > 0.5e9)
 6. Beam satisfies the above for at least 5 minutes
- Allow temporary (1 minute) violation of conditions 2-5 (machine will automatically respond to “catastrophic” errors; without this condition, we filter out many of the worst faults)


Types of Anomalies

- During hand labeling, we found a natural anomaly categorization:
 1. *Faults*: beam is lost
 2. *Sustained anomalies*: initial deviation followed by a recovery period
- *Sustained anomalies* accounted for ~60% of all anomalies during the study period
- Most *sustained anomalies* were likely missed by operators in real-time
 - Short-lived: typically last <10 seconds
 - FEL degradation: causes beam degradation, not cause beam loss

Fault



Sustained Anomaly




ResilientVAE: Unsupervised AD with contaminated data

- We have focused on finding anomalies in a particular subsystem(s)
- But LCLS has a lot of failure modes!
- Can we find general anomalies in the LCLS beam data?
- Can we also attribute the anomaly back to particular beam readings?

- The challenge is that the beam data is
 - **Unlabeled** → no supervised methods
 - **High (>500) dimensional** → curse of dimensionality for many traditional (distance-based/vector space partitioning) anomaly detection algorithms
 - **Contaminated** → no “normal” training set exists for one-class classifiers


ResilientVAE

- We propose a variant of a Variational AutoEncoder (VAE)
 - v : cleanliness of full input
 - z : latent code
 - w_d : cleanliness of d^{th} input feature
 - x_d : d^{th} input feature
- Neural network is composed of:
 - $p_\theta(x|z)$: encoder
 - $q_\phi(z|x)$: decoder
 - $\pi_d(x)$: feature cleanliness
 - $\gamma(x)$: input cleanliness




$$\mathcal{L}(x) = \sum \gamma(x) \pi_d(x) \mathbb{E}_{q_\phi(z|x)} [\log p_\theta(x_d|z)] - \lambda_1 \gamma(x) D_{KL}(q_\phi(z|x) || p(z))$$

ResilientVAE: Example Anomaly



↑
RF station fault

Minor beam loss



Minor beam loss